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l'l THE SUPREilE COURT OF TEE 
STATI: OF CTAH 
ROGER SCEJ'!ITT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
RICHARD A. BILLINGS, SAH S!HTH, 
UTAH STATE PRISON, DIVISION OP 
CORRECTIONS, DEPARTHENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES OP THE STATE Oc 
UTAH, and JAJ'1ES BARTELL, 
Defendants-Respondents.: 
Case No. l6n34 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action, initiated bv the plaintiff-appellant 
in the Court below, in a civil action for specific damages 
against officers of the Utah State Prison, the Warden of the 
Prison, th9 Division of Corrections Denartment of Social 
Services of the State of Utah, and the Prison itself for 
defendants-respondents alleged negligent handling of plaintiff-
appellant's personal oroperty. 
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DISPOSITIUc! IN TilE LO\JER COUPT 
The lower Court granted the defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and denied the 1 
P aintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges this Court to affir~ the trial 
court's granting of the Motion to Dismiss and denial of 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEM.ENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant is an inmate at the Utah State Prison 
at Draper, Utah (hereinafter, the Prison). The resnondents 
James Bartell and Richard A. Billings at all times pertinent 
to this action were employees of the prison and worked there 
as property officers under the direction of the respondent 
Samuel Smith and the respondent government agency. At the 
time of the filing of this action in the Court below, responden', 
Samuel Smith was ••arden of the prison and worked under the 
direction of the resPondent government agency. 
Directly prior to July 31, 1977, the appellant was 
an inmate housed in a cell on the fourth deck of A-Block at 
the prison, and was in possession of various items of personal 
property. on or about July 31, 1977, appellant was transfMr~ 
to another cell within the prison located on B-Block North. 
The appellant was instructed not to bring his personal 
-2- l 
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property to his new cell, but was to!d by 2 prison officer 
that his Personal prorerty would be stored by the orison 
property officers, the respondents James Bartell and Richard 
A. Billings. 
On or about November 22, 1977, the appellant was 
transferred from B-Block North to A-Block at the prison. 
ApPellant requested that the respondents return the personal 
items left in his cell on July 31, 1977. On Nove~ber 23, 
1977, appellant was given the property and signed a receipt 
acknowledging receipt of "all the property stored on C-Block." 
Appellant later alleged that some of the items of 
personal property in his "A" Block cell on July 31, 1977, had 
not been returned to him on November 23, 1977. Allegedly these 
missing items include a bathrobe, pair of sandals, wrist 
watch, rug, jacket, tape measure, pair of house slippers and 
two pair of jeans. 
Appellant filed an action with the Prison Grievance 
committee. It was determined that since appellant had signed 
the receipt, he had apparently lost no property and no further 
action was taken at the Prison level. 
This action was filed in the T!1ird Judicial District 
court in and for the County of Salt Lake, seeking specific 
damages. The respondents were represented by their counsel, 
-3-
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and filcc1 a notion to Dism1ss. 'l'he plointiff filed a Hotio, 
for Summary LTudgG1ent. 'The '-lotion for Summ,,rv Jm1qf:lc>nt 
\·las supported by affidavit. Appellant also serve•~ the 
respondents with Interrogatories and Requests for 1\dmissions. 
These \vere not answered. Doth parties subr.1i tter1 'lemoranda ir 
support of their Motions. The Motions were argue0 to the 
Court on September 8, 1978. Both Motions were considered 
by the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court granted the respondent's rtotion to 
Dismiss and denied the appellant's Motion :~or Sumn:ary 
Judgment. 
The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on 
the dismissal of his Complaint and on the denial of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY \.RANTED 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAir1 FOR HHICH 
RELIEF' CAN BE GRANTED. 
The standard or review for determining the 
propriety of a motion to dismiss is stated in Liquor Control 
Commission v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 263 P.2d 441 (J952). 
-4-
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The Court in Athas held that: 
"If the plaintiff would not be 
entitled to recover under any set of 
facts which could be proved in support 
of his claim, a motion to dismiss is 
properly granted." (242 P. 2d at 443). 
The Court in Athas, went further and stated with 
reference to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that "trial 
courts have wide discretion in applying the rules." 
The defense8f immunity from liability is considered 
an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the Ctah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Generally an affirmative defense is im-
properly plead in a motion to dismiss unless dispositive of 
the c~se on the face of the pleadings. 
The Court has yet to rule specifically on the 
propriety of pleading the defense of immunity in a 12(b) (6) 
motion to dismiss. But guidance can be gained from other 
cases dealing with this issue. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In light of the similarity between the two rules, 
Federal cases interpreting Federal Rule 12 should be 
considered in determining the propriety of pleading the defense 
of immunity in a 12(b) (6) motion. 
-5-
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1\ motio:1 tc' c1isr iss rc,quirr,o; the· court_ to 
examine the allec;,cctions of the coP1plaint_ and thr> re,;nonsi"c 
pleading without resort to other pleaclings or outsicle 
evidence. Camero v. Kostos, 253 F. SupD. 33' (r_;.s. D.c. 
N.J. 1966). Affirmative defenses generally require going 
beyond the pleadinqs to determine their validity. A motion 
to dismiss is improperly granted if it is based on an 
affirmative defense which requires proof, i.e. res judicate 
release or discharge in bankruptcy. Immunity is statutory 
and requires no evidentiary proof. 
The defense of governmental irrrmnity is properlv 
plead therefore in a motion to dismiss if dispositive of 
the case. Caruth v. Geddes, 443 F. Supo. 1295 (D.C. Ill. 
1978), Rafferty v. Prince George County, 423 F. Supp. 1045, 
(D.C. Md. 1976). 
Caruth, supra., dealt with a suit under 42 U.S.C. 
section 1983. It VTas a civil rights action by a state prisone: 1 
against a public defender. Cases construing 42 U.S.C. sect~n 
1983 provide that a public defender enjoys immunity fron 
actions for dar,ages when acting within the scope c·f his or 
her employment. The Court in Caruth stated inununity was a 
-6-
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d0fcnso properly olcad in a motion to disniss for failure 
to state a clairr for which relief can be granted. The Court 
ruled, however, that the granting of the motion was improper 
where the complaint contained an allegation of intentional 
misconduct. 
Rafferty, suora, was another suit based on 42 u.s.c. 
section 1983. Plaintiffs in Rafferty were suing oolice 
officers and firemen for misconduct in the investigation of 
an apartment fire. The defendants moved to dismiss on the 
ground of immunity. Defendants asserted that they were 
government officials and employees acting in their official 
capacities and therefore immune under 42 r.s.c. 1983. The 
court held that this immunity was qualified and that the 
dismissal of the suit by the trial court was improper where 
the'complaint contained an allegation of malicious conduct. 
Appellant's complaint alleges only negligence on 
the part of the defendants. Appellant further alleges th~s 
negligence occurred while the defendants were acting within 
the scope of their official employment. 
The general presumption which accompanies a motion 
to dismiss, is that the allegations in the complaint must 
be taken as true. Miree v. Dekalb County Ge~rgia, 97 S.Ct. 
2490, 433 U.S. 25 (1977). Following the presumption as to 
-7-
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the truth of 3ppnllant's allegations, apoellant has still 
failed to state a claim for which relief can be ~ granted. 
Appellant in his comrlaint has plead only 1· ~ neg lgence. , 
Section 63-30-10(10) Utah Code Ann. states that: 
"Immunity from suit of all 
governmental ~ntities is waived 
for injury proximately causeJ bv 
the negligent acts or omissions~ 
fo an employee committed within the 
scope of his employment excent 
inter alia if the injury: 
(10) arises out of the in-
carceration of any person in any 
state prison. 
The appellant in his complaint alleges all the 
essential elements ennurnerated in section 63-30-10(10). 
Respondent plead the defense by motion to dismisE because 
it was dispositive. On the face of the pleadings, apPellant 
can prove no set of facts \vhich would entitle him to relief. 
The issue of negligence and liability of the individual 
defendants is discussed in point II. 
The trial court as a matter of law, and in its 
discretion properly determined that appellant failed to 
state a claim for which relief can be granted. 
The purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to 
ensure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action. Gardner v. Park v!est Village, 568 P. 2d 7 34 (Utah 1977) 
-8-
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Respondent by filing a motion to dismiss rather 
than an answer sought to comply with the oolicy and purpose 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. By disposing of this case 
on a motion to dismiss, respondent has avoid~d the time, 
expense and inconvenience of a hearing on the merits. Such 
a hearing would be unjustified in light of section 63-30-10(10). 
qesoondent asserts that on a motion to ~ismiss, it 
was improper for the trial court to go to the merits of the 
appellant's case. On the other hand, even if it were nermissible 
to consider the merits, appellant was given a fair hearing 
on the merits at the prison level. 
The Prison Rules and Procedures Provide that an 
innate may file a complaint with the Prison ~rievance 
Committee. The inmate must put in writing the basic facts, 
the specific grievance and the relief sought. Appellant 
complied with these formalities. After the complaint is 
submitted to the Prison Grievance Committee, a formal hearing 
is held. 
At this formal hearing, the defendants produced n 
receipt signed by the appellant. The receipt acknowledged 
the fact that appellant had received all his prooertv. 
Appellant failed to produce at the hearing anv inventory or 
other proof of the existence of the allegedlv missing proPerty. 
-9-
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The (;rievctnce Cor-cetitU;c c1C>terrinr·<1 after considorinr; the 
evidence presented, snecificallv the si~n~d rcceiot, that 
appellctnt's claim was without merit. 
Despite the existence of section F3-38-lQ(lO), 
the Prison has a procedure to give prisoners a remeHy for 
internal problems. Respondent asserts that this remedy was 
more than generous in light of section (3-30-10(10). 
Respondent does not rely on the investigation of the Prison 
Grievance Committee as dispositive hecause this would go to 
the merits of appellant's case. However, appellan-t Vias not 
without a remedy and at this state of the litigation, secti~ 
63-30-10(10) controls and is dispositive of this case 
without reaching the merits. 
vlhile it v1ould be improper for the trial court to 
consider the merits of appellant's claim should this court 
choose to do so, respondent asserts that the hearing at the 
prison level disposes of this case on the merits. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS HAY NOT BE SUED 
I!JDIVIDUALLY FOR ORDINARY NEGLIGENT 
ACTS COHI'HTTED IVITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
THEIR Ef,IPLOYNENT. 
This Court has consistently held in ordinary 
negligence cases like this one that governmental 
immunity applies to the individual state employee 
acting within the scope of his employment. Sheffield v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 {1968); Ohray v. 
Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 {1971); Anderson 
Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 
144 (1972); Roosendaal Construction v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 
3 9 6 1 50 3 p • 2d 4 4 6 ( 19 7 2) • 
The Sheffield case is directly in point. There 
the plaintiff was suing the State, the Prison, the Warden 
and some prison personnel for negligence. The plaintiff 
claimed negligence in that he received injuries from 
another inmate of whose violent propensities the defendants 
were aware. 
The Court stated that the Warden was not a 
"governmental entity" under the language of the statute 
(445 P.2d at 368). 
The Court went further and held that the 
immunity doctrine upon which Section 63-30-10(10) is 
based applies to prison personnel in their individual 
capacity. 
-11-
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The Court in Sheffield, suprd, was not unm 1· d 
--- n fu 
of the possibility for abuse by prison personnel. They 
stated: 
"We quite willingly agree that 
they [the inmates] should not be 
'thrown to the wolves' without 
protection, and that some safeguards 
should he maintained to prevent such 
abuse or injury. 
On the other side of this proposi-
tion is the imperative need for those in 
a supervisory capacity to have reasonable 
freedom to discharge the burdensome 
responsibilities of keeping in confine-
ment and maintaining discipline of a 
large number of men who have been 
convicted of serious crime. If such 
officials are too vulnerable to lawsuits 
for anything untoward which may happen 
to inmates a number of evils follow, 
including a breakdown of discipline and 
the fact that capable persons would be 
discouraged from taking such public 
positions." 445 P.2d at 368-369. 
Moreover, the Court went on to conclude: 
• the Warden and other prison 
officers are protected by the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity against claims of 
negligence so long as they are acting in 
good faith and within the scope of their 
duties, and that they could not be held 
liable unless they were guilty of some 
conduct which transcended the bounds of 
good faith performance of their duty by 
a wilful or malicious wrongful act which 
they know or should know would result in 
injury." 445 P.2d at 369. 
The appellant has failed to allege in any of 
his pleadings any intentional or malicious misconduct 
-12-
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which would bring him within the exception of Sheffield. 
Appellant contends that the individual 
respondents are liable and relies on the recent case of 
Madsen v. State of Utah, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). 
Respondent submits that Madsen is in complete 
accord with the reasoning and authorities already cited, 
and does not allow relief in this case. 
Madsen, supra, was a suit for wrongful death 
by the wife and daughter of an inmate. The action in 
t1adsen was brought in the Third District Court against 
the State of Utah, Division of Corrections, the Warden, 
and other prison personnel. The defendants in Madsen 
moved for a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of their 
motion, defendants cited Section 63-30-10(10) as 
dispositive. The trial court granted the motion to 
dismiss on that basis. 
The plaintiffs in Madsen appealed the dismissal 
to this Court. This Court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling as to the State of Utah and the other governmental 
entities. The case was reversed and remanded as to the 
individual defendants to determine their liability for 
the wrongful death of Mr. Madsen. 
-13-
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Wrongful death has traditionally been a 
statutory tort, specifically giving the heirs of the 
decedent a cause of action. This follows fro~ the 
traditional notion that a tort is personal to the 
injured party and the cause of action dies with him 
(see generally Prosser, Law of Torts section 127, 
{'lrongful Death). 
Wrongful death has traditionallv been based 
on different or more than one degree of fault of the 
defendant, i.e., negligence, recklessness, malicious, 
wilful and/or intentional misconduct. There is some 
authority for strict liability in wrongful death actions 
as well. The Tungus v. Skougaard, 358 u.s. 589 (1958), 
Prosser, supra, section 127. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-11-7 (1933), allows the 
heirs of the deceased to maintain an action for wrongful 
death caused by the "wrongful act" or neglect of another. 
This Court has yet to define the bounds of "wrongful 
act." Presumably it covers intentional and malicious acts. 
Conceivably, it could even be interpreted to mean acts 
which amount to less than negligence and approach strict 
liability. 358 U.S. at 590. 
The complaint in Madsen, being based on the 
wrongful death statute, by implication contained an 
-14-
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allegation of ''wrongful acts." A motion to dismiss in 
Madsen could not properly dispose of the ''wrongful acts" 
element of the cause of action. Section 63-30-10(10) 
refers only to negligent acts. 
The Court in Madsen concluded that there were 
not enough facts before it to determine the degree of 
culpability of the individual defendants. Since wrongful 
death may be based on intentional or malicious acts, 
the Court remanded the case to determine liability. 
If on remand it was determined the death of Mr. Madsen 
resulted from ordinary negligence, Section 63-30-10(10) 
would apply as in Sheffield. Such a conclusion is 
consistent with the previous policy of this Court with 
regard to the governmental immunity statute. 
Justice Maughan in a brief concurring opinion 
argued that Madsen should be limited to its facts. 
Justice Maughan asserts that Section 63-30-10(10) should 
be strictly construed and applied only to conduct related 
to incarceration, rather than surgery. This would 
take Madsen out of the exception of paragraph 10 of 
Section 63-30-10 and allow recovery. 
The Court in Madsen declined to overrule the 
long line of cases disallowing recovery for negligent 
acts of state employees committed within the scope of 
their employment. The Court in Madsen states that the 
-15-
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legislative purpose of Section n3-30-10(10) is to 
prevent frivolous and harrassing suits against the 
state. 583 P.2d at 94. This is the same reasoning 
the Court in Sheffield applied. 
The appellant by his complaint even if 
taken as true has alleged no more than negligence. 
Appellant has alleged the defendants were acting 
within the scope of their employment. Appellant has 
not alleged in his comnlaint bad faith or misconduct 
on the part of the defendants. 
Furthermore, even if the trial court were 
to consider the requests for admissions and consider 
them as true, appellant is in no better position. 
The request for admissions if taken as true establish 
only negligence. 
This case is the type the legislature sought 
to prevent by enacting Section 63-30-10(10). Factually 
Madsen and the present case show no similarity. In th~ 
case the appellant was transferred from Medium to 
Maximum Security for disciPlinary action. Appellant 
claims certain property was in his cell and that the 
property was held for him by the prison officials. 
Appellant alleges that despite his signing a receipt 
for all his property, some of the property was missing. 
-16-
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The missing property allegedly consisted of a bathrobe, 
a pair of slippers and two pair of blue jeans. Compared 
to the loss of life in Madsen, appellant's alleged loss 
of his bathrobe and blue jeans must be considered 
frivolous and fits and kind of lawsuit the legislature 
intended Section 63-30-10(10) to prevent. 
Madsen is further distinguishable on its 
facts. In Madsen, the heirs are suing rather than an 
inmate himself. The statutory right is theirs and they 
are not incarcerated or the injury does not arise out 
of their incarceration. 
The Madsen case, then, is distinguishable on 
its facts and consistent with the decisions previously 
cited, specifically Sheffield. 
The controlling case in the circumstances of 
the present action is and should be Sheffield. Further-
more, from a policy standpoint, any other interpretation 
of Section 63-30-10(10) than the one given in Sheffield 
and urged by the respondents contravenes the purpose of 
an immunity statute. 
Section 63-30-10(10) is limited to negligence. 
It does not forbid suits against either governmental 
entities or individual employees for intentional malicious 
or even reckless acts. The appellant is also given a 
remedy for negligence at the prison level. 
-17-
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Respondents submit the tr.ial court properly 
grantC'd respondents' Rule 12 (b) (6) motion based on 
Section 63-30-10(10) and its proper application to the 
facts. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOT I0!1 FOR SUf1MARY JUOG11ENT. 
For the same reasons it was proper to grant 
respondents' motion to dismiss, it was proper to deny 
appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is proper only where there 
is no issue of material fact. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). Summary judgment is also 
improper where as here the defendant has a valid 
defense. Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson. 
9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (1959). 
The defense of immunity in this case not only 
precludes summary judgment, but is dispositive of the 
case for the reasons stated in Point I. Appellant 
admits there is an issue of material fact and later cla~s 
there are no real issues of material fact. He states 
that defendants' failure to respond to the requests for 
admissions under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procerture establishes all the elements of his claim. 
This is against the great weight of authority interpreting 
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Procedure. 
Failure to answer requests for admissions 
does not automatically constitute an admission. The 
trial court in its discretion may allow additional time 
and refuse to grant summary judgment. French v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1968). 
The trial court in this case had the discretion 
to disregard the requests for admission for several 
reasons. First, they were improper to consider on a 
motion to dismiss. Second, the defense of immunity was 
dispositive of the case even if the trial court were to 
consider the admission and deem them as true. The 
requests for admissions if taken as true establish no 
more than the negligence of the defendants. 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
illustrate the degree of discretion the trial court 
has in applying these rules. Rule 37 deals with the 
sanctions for failure to make discovery. 
Rule 37(c} lists a number of findings the 
trial court can make justifying the failure to make 
discovery. The Court may find: 
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(2) the admission sought 
was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failinq to admit had 
reasonable ground to believe that he 
might prevail on the matter, or (d) 
there was other good reason for failure 
to admit." 
Rule 37(a) also requires the appellant to 
move the court to order compliance with discovery. 
The appellant has not done that in this case. If the 
party fails to comply with the Rule 37 order compelling 
them to respond to the admissions, the requesting 
party must then prove the admissions. Rule 37(e) 
allows the party requesting the admissions to collect 
costs and expenses incurred in proving the unanswered 
admissions. As noted previously the trial court may 
find any one of a number of reasons justifying the 
failure to answer the requests for admissions. 
Respondent in this case submits that the failure 
to answer the request for admissions was justified for 
several reasons. The admission was not important in that 
it would prove or disprove only ordinary negligence from 
which respondents are immune from liability. Respondents 
had reasonable ground to believe, based on Sheffield and 
similar cases, that they would prevail on the matter. 
Finally, respondents believed that the insignificance 
of the claim and the expense involved in responding to 
the request for admissions were good reasons for faili~ 
to admit. 
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Appellant seems to rely on the recent case 
of Gardner v. Park Hcst \~illage, ~· in support 
of his contention that summary judg~ent should 
have been granted. From the outset it should be noted 
that the result in Gardner is harsh. Gardner is also a 
case uncommon on its facts and in the result reached. 
The plaintiff in Gardner filed a complaint 
and requested admissions under Rule 36. The defendant 
failed to answer on time and failed to request leave 
of the court for more time. After the Court granted 
more time the defendant failed to appear at the hearing 
on the motions and failed to respond to discovery. 
The defendant's dilatory tactics cost the plaintiff a great 
deal of both time and money in proving his claim. 
The rules were designed to secure a just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. 
568 P.2d at 738. The result in the Gardner case is 
harsh but justified in light of the defendant's costly 
delays and uncooperative attitude. 
Respondent asserts that the failure to respond 
to the requests for admissions in this case was in the 
interest of a speedy and inexpensive determination of 
the case. The result would have been the same even 
though the respondent had answered the requests for 
admissions. 
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The trial court properly denied annellant's 
motion for surrunary judgment. The application of Pules 
36 and 37 is largely a m~tter of discretion with the 
trial court. The Gardner court was careful to note: 
••• the imposition of the sanctions 
of Rule 37 must be tempered by a careful 
exercise of judicial discretion." 568 
P.2d at 738. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court dismissed appellant's claim 
in a proper exercise of discretion. In a case such as 
this, appellant is afforded a remedy at an administrative 
level. 
The intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 
63-30-10(10) was to deal with cases like this. 
The trial court properly interpreted the policy 
and purpose of both Section 63-30-10(10) and the Utah R~a 
of Civil Procedure. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLO\'l 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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